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The slogan of the 2008 Beijing Olympics slogan is“One World, One Dream.” Chinese officials claimthat this slogan fully reflects the essence and the uni-
versal values of the Olympic spirit — unity, friendship,
progress, harmony, participation, and dreaming. However, a
review of the historical development of sport in modern
China shows that sport has more often been connected with
political ideology. This article explores the relationship be-
tween political ideology and sport in China through a review
of Chinese and Western literature. 
Nearly a century ago, Tianjin Youth magazine published an
article entitled “On Sports Competition.” Commenting on
the upcoming London Olympics, the author asked, “How
long must the Chinese wait to win a medal in the Olympic
Games?” He appealed to the Chinese government to take
responsibility for developing sports and to host the Olympics
in China. (1) On 23 October 1908, educator Zhang Boling
(1876-1951) from the Nankai School in Tianjin advocated
China’s participation in the London games. A slide presen-
tation on the Olympic Games during the opening ceremony
of the Sixth United Schools Sports Meet in Tianjin aroused
students to ask similar questions: “When will China send an
athlete to win in the Olympic Games? When will China
send an athlete team to win in the Olympic Games? When
will China host the Olympics and invite international dele-
gations to ‘Peking’ for the games?” (2)
These questions must be carefully considered in the context
of the historical materials of their time and place. At the
same time, it is important to clarify how China’s “imagined
Olympians” (3) and “sick man” complex (4) were used and
evolved in Chinese and Western literature over the last cen-
tury, and how China has recognized and presented itself
through an image of Western Olympians that is coloured by
Western imperialism.
According to Foucauldian methods of discursive analysis,
the answer may lie somewhere within the structure of the
question. In the same year of 1908, coincidently, a famous
sport advocate, Xu Yibing, who objected to military exercise
in schools, used the motto “Strengthen the Chinese national
physique, wipe out the shame of ‘the sick man of Asia’!”
when he took over the first physical education school in
China — the Chinese Gymnastic School. (5) In fact, from the
nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, a fear of
national decline and racial extinction had been planted
among Chinese intellectuals, and some began to associate
physical education with national strength. One of these con-
cerned intellectuals was Mao Zedong, whose thinking has
influenced the development of sport in China for more than
a half century. 
This paper will discuss the following questions: What was
the significance of physical culture and sport in China a cen-
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The development of sports in China since the nineteenth century has been influenced to varying degrees by
imperialism, nationalism, Maoism, and postcolonial thinking. This paper explores these ideologies from three
angles: (i) Mao’s early thinking regarding physical culture and sport; (ii) the development of sports under Mao’s
socialism and the Cultural Revolution; and (iii) China’s breakthrough in the post-Mao era. In sum, sport remains
connected over time with the idea of “imagined Olympians” and of a response to the “Sick Man complex.” The advent
of postcolonial thought has opened the possibility of more diverse understandings of sports in China. 
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tury ago? What was Mao’s thought on physical culture and
sport, and how did it affect the development of sport in
China? How has sport developed in the post-Mao era? To
answer these questions, this paper is organized into three
sections. Section one introduces Mao’s early thought on
physical culture and sport along with his ideology of nation-
alism. Section two critically evaluates the development of
sports under Mao’s socialism and the Cultural Revolution.
Section three examines how and why China began to pay
attention to international sport and made great strides in the
post-Mao era. Mao’s  ear ly  thought  onphys ical  culture
Mao’s early thought on physical culture was affected by the
national humiliation of defeat in the Opium Wars and in
other subsequent conflicts, which left deep and lasting scars
on the entire nation. Sport seemed to play an important
role in the process of Western cultural imperialism within
various social formations in China. It also played a major
role in the transmission of imperial and national ideas from
the late nineteenth century onwards. In particular, some
constitutional reformers frequently used the human body as
a metaphor for a nation or national system. (6) Liang
Qichao (7) emphasized physical education as the most im-
portant part of education (8) and considered physical culture
a crucial factor in developing both the people and the na-
tion. Likewise, Yang Jui-sung has observed that Liang
Qichao invested new meaning in the term “sick man of
Asia” to stress the importance of national physical reform. (9)
The term subsequently appeared frequently in Western and
Chinese publications to refer to a weakening or declining
nation such as old Turkey or the Manchu Empire in the late
nineteenth century. It is Liang who first applied the term
for a nation to actual Chinese people in his article entitled
“New Citizen” (1903), where he wrote, “It’s tragic that
none of our four hundred million people have a sound
physique. A nation composed entirely of sick individuals is
surely a sick nation. (10)
Perhaps inspired by Liang, the author Zeng Pu subse-
quently used “Sick Man of Asia” (Dong ya bing fu) as a
pseudonym to publish a very popular novel, Flower in an
Ocean of Sin (Nie hai hua), which helped disseminate the
term rapidly throughout China. Following Liang, public
opinion appropriated “sick man” to refer to the humiliating
weakness of Chinese people, and the term became popular
among Chinese writers. Ironically, however, as time went
on, the Chinese came to regard the phrase as a contemptu-
ous criticism from the West, gradually forgetting that it had
been invented and imposed by Chinese. With this trans-
ferred attribution came a determination to “wipe out” the
humiliation of the “sick man of Asia” through triumph in in-
ternational sporting competitions. (11)
Modern Chinese nationalism manifested itself on 4 May
1919, when more than 3,000 Beijing students endorsed a
manifesto denouncing the decision of the Paris Peace Con-
ference to transfer Germany’s concessions in Shandong
Province to Japan. The student demonstration against
Japanese imperialism provoked similar demonstrations in
other major cities, not only by students but also by the mer-
chant class and patriots of various stripes. The May Fourth
Movement was a milestone in the growth of Chinese nation-
alism, and interest in the West and its concepts of democ-
racy, science, and modernization were further challenged by
Marxism as the impact of the October Revolution of 1917
in Russia made itself felt. It was during this debate that the
major political divisions between the Nationalists and Com-
munists arose. 
As a faithful reader of New Youth, a magazine established
in 1915 by the founder of the Chinese Communist Party,
Chen Duxiu, Mao was deeply inspired by the New Culture
Movement and was influenced by Chen’s observations on
physical strength in an earlier article. Mao’s first article, “A
Study of Physical Culture,” published in New Youth in
April 1917, can be regarded as one of the most influential
writings on sport in China. Mao’s arguments obviously fol-
lowed Chen’s earlier article promoting man’s bestial nature
(shouxing zhuyi). At a time when nationalism was spreading
throughout China, both Mao and Chen believed that Chi-
nese people were suffering the catastrophe of losing their
country. Mao argued:
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Our country is being drained of its strength. Public in-
terest in martial arts is flagging. The people’s health
is declining with each passing day. These phenomena
deserve serious concern. Exponents of physical edu-
cation have over the years failed to accomplish any-
thing because they have never gotten to the root of
the problem. Our country will weaken further if
things are allowed to continue unchanged for long. It
should be noted that athletic feats such as marksman-
ship and shot-putting are external skills that result
from training, whereas muscular strength is something
internal that enhances performance. How can a per-
son shoot accurately or make a long-distance throw if
he has a poor physique and is afraid of weapons?
Muscular strength comes from training, which must
be done conscientiously. Physical educators of today
have devised a few methods, but they have failed to
achieve the desired results. This is because external
forces have little appeal to a public that is unaware of
the real significance of physical education. What are
its effects and how should one go about it? Since peo-
ple are all at sea with these questions, it is only natu-
ral that little result has been attained. To make phys-
ical culture effective, it is imperative to activate the
minds of the people and make them sports-con-
scious. (12)
Mao, like Chen Duxiu, emphasised the fitness and hygiene
aspects rather than the Western competitive aspect of sports
throughout his life. His early article also expressed the na-
tionalism and admiration for the militaristic spirit that he re-
tained throughout his career. Mao’s advocacy of physical cul-
ture and exercise was aimed at saving the country, but Chen
Duxiu disagreed with the combination of physical education
and military drills embodied in the CCP’s sport programme
under Mao’s leadership while the party struggled for survival
from 1927 to 1949. 
From the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century,
a strong current of nationalism influenced physical culture in
China. The Chinese Communists were ardent nationalist
long before 1937, and they played a crucial role in transform-
ing the primitive xenophobia of the peasantry against the
Japanese invaders into a modern nationalist response. (13)
This strong nationalist sentiment became one of the key fea-
tures of Mao’s political thought. Like the nationalism of in-
tellectuals that clashed with their rejection of China’s cul-
tural heritage, Mao’s nationalist beliefs were not easily rec-
onciled with the internationalist content of Marxism. This
ideological conflict would give rise to many tensions embod-
ied in the development of physical culture and sport after the
establishment of the New China.Sport,  Maoism and theCultural  Revolut ion 
The CCP divided the future development of Chinese soci-
ety into two successive phases, namely the bourgeois-demo-
cratic revolution and the socialist revolution. The New
Democracy was the term used to describe the first of these
phases. Its policies and orientation emanated from an essay
by Mao Zedong published in 1940. “On New Democracy”
outlined the principles of a transitional system in which a
temporary alliance of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie,
and national bourgeoisie would co-exist under CCP leader-
ship. The period of New Democracy would effectively come
to an end with the socialist transformation of industry and
the drive for collectivisation in 1953. When Mao com-
mented upon the New Democracy, he explained precisely
why China needed to build a new society, state, and na-
tion. (14)
Sport was seen as an important part of China’s new national
culture, but Mao is reported to have made few significant
statements on the nature of physical culture. In 1952, at the
June inaugural meeting of the All-China Sports Federation,
he called on the Chinese people to “Develop physical cul-
ture and sport, and strengthen the physique of the peo-
ple.” (15) In 1953, during a speech on behalf of the Presidium
of the Second National Congress of the New Democratic
Youth League of China, Mao said:
Now we must make sure that everybody, including
workers, peasants, soldiers, students and cadres, can
keep fit. Of course, it does not necessarily mean that
if you are in good health you will be good at study,
for study must be done in the proper way… Now it is
necessary to arrange some recreation for which there
12. Chen Duxiu, “Jin ri zhi jiao yu fang zhen (Present educational policy),” New Youth,
Volume 1, no. 2, 1915, pp. 1-4.
13. Mao Zedong, A Study of Physical Culture, Beijing, People’s Sport Publishing House
Press, 1996, pp. 3-4. 
14. Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of The People’s Republic, Free Press,
1999, p. 39.
15. “For many years we Communists have struggled for a cultural revolution as well as for
a political and economic revolution, and our aim is to build a new society and a new
state for the Chinese nation. The new society and new state will have not only a new
politics and a new economy but also a new culture.” Selected Works of Mao Zedong
Volume II, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1967, pp. 339-384. 
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must be time and facilities, and this end should be
firmly grasped too. The Party Central Committee has
decided to cut down the number of meetings and
study hours, and you must see to it that this decision
is carried out. Challenge anyone who refuses to do
so. In short, young people should be enabled to keep
fit, study well and work well. (16)
In this statement Mao illustrated his earlier views regarding
young people, in particular those who needed more time for
play, recreation, and sport. Mao saw in them the hope of
building a new China. He used the slogan “Keep fit. Study
well. Work well.” (17) Mao’s later statement came in a speech
on 27 February 1957, “On the Correct Handling of Contra-
dictions Among the People,” when he said, “We should en-
able everyone who receives an education to develop morally,
intellectually and physically and became a worker possessed
of both socialist consciousness and a general education.” (18)
Although these statements are simple, their significance lies
in their constant citation, and in the fact that they, combined
with Mao’s 1917 essay, comprise the substance of Chinese
communist physical culture policy during the Mao era. Al-
though Mao did not mention sport in “On New Democ-
racy,” he summarised the direction the new democratic cul-
ture should take:
New democratic culture is national… New demo-
cratic culture is scientific… New democratic culture
belongs to the broad masses and is therefore demo-
cratic… A national, scientific and mass culture—such
is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the
people, the culture of New Democracy, the new cul-
ture of the Chinese nation. (19)
In line with Mao’s philosophy, Feng Wenbin, the inaugural
president of the All-China Sports Federation, spelled out
the task of physical culture at the 1949 meeting of the fed-
eration, where he stated that the motto of the New Demo-
cratic physical culture was “to develop sports for people’s
16. See Mao’s words in New Physical Culture, 25 July 1952, p. 2.
17. In Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Volume V, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1977, pp. 96-97.
18. Ibid., p. 97.
19. Ibid., p. 405.
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The slogan of the poster explains that it is necessary “
to exercise one’s body for the revolution.” 
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health, New Democratic construction, and the people’s na-
tional defence.” (20) In short, Feng defined the New Demo-
cratic physical culture as national, scientific, and mass. In
terms of national physical culture, Mao argued that Chinese
sport was national and that “it opposes imperialist oppres-
sion and upholds the dignity and independence of the Chi-
nese nation. It belongs to our own nation and bears our own
national characteristics.” (21)
Chinese sport needed a national character, but it also
needed to combine with other advanced sport systems such
as the successful sports development model of the Soviet
Union at that time. Chinese sport was to be a part of the
world’s “New Sport.” In terms of scientific physical culture,
Chinese sport was opposed to all feudal and superstitious
ideas, and stood for seeking truth from facts, for objective
truth, and for the unity of theory and practice. (22)
Viewed as unified and progressive, sport had to contribute
to Communist political action, which formed a systematic
united front against imperialism and feudalism. Furthermore,
both the body and the mind had to be kept in balance in
terms of overall human development. In terms of mass phys-
ical culture, sport was viewed as serving and belonging to the
masses. From the schools to the factories, from the cities to
the villages, and from the intellectuals to labourers, sport had
to be viewed as spreading throughout the masses. (23)
In Feng’s description, the New Democratic physical culture
was one of the core themes of Mao’s New Democracy. (24)
The vision of a national physical culture was shaped by
Mao’s thoughts on Chinese nationalism. The argument
about scientific physical culture did not require sport to con-
form to the principles of science or for all sports programmes
to adhere to the principles of physiology, hygiene, anatomy,
and physics, but rather required a close relationship between
physical culture and scientific research. It accommodated
Mao’s thoughts on anti-feudalism rather than on scientific
method. Accordingly, a national, scientific, and mass physi-
cal culture was based upon the anti-imperialist and anti-feu-
dal culture of the people, the culture of New Democracy,
and the new culture of the Chinese nation. In other words,
New Democratic physical culture meant new physical cul-
ture, while old physical culture referred to sports develop-
ment before 1949.
Following Feng’s explanation of New Democratic physical
culture, Xu Yingchao in 1950 provided a critique of the es-
sential characteristics of “old” physical culture: (25)
Modern Chinese sport methods, organisations and
theories have been copied from the USA, which is a
capitalist imperialist state, its politics, economics, mil-
itary and education all serve the bourgeoisie. The
American imperialists spread their sport not because
they were concerned about the health of the Chinese
people, but because sport was an ideal tool of cultural
imperialism. The American imperialists emphasised
to the Chinese people that American sports equip-
ment is the best, their athletes are the fastest and
their basketball team is the top one… in the world.
American sport was perfect in every field. The Chi-
nese Old physical educators always believed that
American sport was superior to China’s. American
sport served the dominant classes and was not for
masses. (26)
Regarding Xu’s statements on “old” Chinese sport, it must
be noted that sport was not only copied from the United
States, but that its advocates also disseminated the superior
image of American sport and endowed American sport
methods, organisations, theories, and equipment with cul-
tural imperialism. Certainly, as has been indicated here, new
physical culture accompanied Mao’s anti-imperialist
thoughts on Chinese nationalism. This is one of the reasons
why New China developed a “new” physical culture. On
the other hand, apart from Western sport, the New Demo-
cratic physical culture could be seen as empty theory from
Mao’s thoughts, which did not develop into a sports policy
or system in the New China. In fact, China learned sport
from the Soviet “Labour-Defence System” during 1950 and
1957.
China copied a great deal from the Soviet sports system in
the early years of the People’s Republic. The editor’s first
column in New Physical Culture, for example, declares that
“To establish New Physical Culture, we must learn from the
Soviet Union and other People’s Democracies.” (27) In a
speech at a preparatory meeting of the National Physical
Culture Committee in 1950, Vice Chairman Zhu De in-
sisted, “We shall learn well from the sports experience of the
Soviet Union.” (28) A few months later, while the first Soviet
20. See M. Meisner, op. cit., pp. 380-382. 
21. In New Physical Culture, 1 July 1950, pp. 8-9.
22. See M. Meisner, op. cit., p. 380.
23. Ibid., p. 381.
24. See M. Meisner, op. cit.
25. See M. Meisner, op. cit.
26. In New Physical Culture, 1 July 1950, pp. 10-11.
27. Ibid., p. 10
28. Ibid., p. 6.
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sports delegation was visiting China, Zhu De emphasised
again, “Chinese sport should learn from our Russian com-
rades and struggle for Chinese people’s sport.” (29)
A Soviet youth delegation visited China in August 1950 and
introduced the Soviet model of sports development. At the
same time, the first Chinese sports delegation visited the So-
viet Union and observed sports development, in particular
Soviet sports organisations. (30) The first sports delegation
from the Soviet Union visited China from 20 December
1950 to 31 January 1951, visiting eight cities and playing 33
basketball games with local teams. Soviet sports experts also
gave talks and held 14 meetings with Chinese sports offi-
cials. They described the current methods of sports develop-
ment in the Soviet Union, basketball organisation and func-
tions, the principles and steps of basic training, basketball
refereeing, and the organisation and duties of sports person-
nel. This tour was seen as an essential first step for the Chi-
nese to learn from Soviet sport during the early days of the
People’s Republic. (31) From 1953 onward, few Soviet sports
experts lectured in China, but He Long, who was the first
Sports Minister of the People’s Republic, led a Chinese del-
egation to the Soviet Union in 1954. Learning from the So-
viet experience was one of few choices available to New
China in its early years, and it was natural that China should
learn, as in other areas, from a fellow socialist state that al-
ready had 33 years of socialist sporting experience.
The Soviet sports influence on China remained quite sub-
stantial until the late 1950s. The “Labour-Defence System”
was a Soviet innovation from 1931 that China adapted as a
national fitness programme. Early school PE manuals were
translated from Russian, and Communist China’s first inter-
national sports contacts were also with the Soviet Union. So-
viet influence was evident in the creation of physical culture
institutes, government financing and control of sports, trade
union sports societies, national ranking for individual sports,
armed forces teams, clubs and sponsorship to enable tal-
ented athletes to train full time, and sports boarding schools
and sports programmes for women. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that Communist China, which considered itself an or-
thodox socialist state, drew on the statements of early com-
munist theorists to justify its efforts in physical culture.
The decision to make the “Labour-Defence System” a for-
mal programme ratified by law was apparently reached dur-
ing the first plenary session of the Central People’s Govern-
29. Ibid., p. 7.
30. New Physical Culture, 25 February 1951, p. 2.
31. Gu Shiquan, Chinese History of Sports, op. cit., p. 343.
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ment Commission on Physical Culture held in Beijing on
16-22 January 1954. During this meeting, Vice-Chairman
Zhu De clarified the connection between national defence
and physical culture, arguing that “In the field of national de-
fence, powerful and skilful bodies are needed by the coun-
try. Because of this, young people must be strong in
physique and bright and lively, courageous and sharp, tough
and unyielding.” (32) The Labour Defence System (called
“Ready for Labour and Defence” in the Soviet Union) was
an essential part of the Soviet influence on Chinese sport
and physical education in schools.
Sport and physical education policy also reflected important
aspects of Mao’s thinking on physical culture and sport. Phys-
ical education became a compulsory subject in schools dur-
ing the early 1950s. Ma Xulun, the Minister of Education,
reported the policy and task of educational work in 1951:
The adoption of effective steps for carrying out Chair-
man Mao’s principle of “Health above all” to im-
prove the students’ state of health, and, on the pre-
vailing foundation, to improve the remuneration of
middle school and elementary schools teachers… The
Physical Culture Committee should be established to
guide all schools in faithfully carrying out the policy of
“Health above all,” in reducing the students’ amount
of class work and after class activities, to promote
sports activities and recreation activities. (33)
Mao’s principle of “health above all” developed into China’s
early policy of physical education in schools. In his speech
“On the Correct Handing of Contradictions Among the
People,” Mao announced that “our educational policy must
enable everyone who receives an education to develop
morally, intellectually and physically and become a worker
with both socialist consciousness and culture.” (34) Physical
education became a significant part of socialist education in
schools. Each of China’s two constitutional documents made
reference to physical culture. The Common Programme—
the legal guidelines before the adopting of a Constitution in
1954—refers both directly and indirectly to physical culture.
Article 41 states: “Culture and education in the People’s
Republic of China are New Democratic, that is, national,
scientific, and popular. The main reasons for raising the cul-
tural level of the people are: training of personnel for na-
tional construction work; liquidation of feudal, comprador,
fascist ideologies; and development of the ideology of serv-
ing the people.” (35) Physical culture was also mentioned in
Article 48: “National sports shall be promoted. Public
health and medical work shall be extended and attention
shall be paid to safeguarding the health of mothers, infants
and children.” (36) In short, the aims of New China’s physical
education were seen as part of the entire New Democratic
culture and education system, which was viewed as national,
scientific, and popular. 
New China naturally relied on the Soviet model to achieve
the goals of new physical culture. A study of Soviet experi-
ence in physical education began in the early 1950s. The
Soviet guidelines for physical education for grades 1-4, 5-7,
and 8-10 were translated into Chinese as a PE teacher’s
guide. Soviet manuals on physical education were studied to
aid China in setting up its own PE system. This included the
aims and responsibilities of PE, the different physiological
traits of various age groups, basic methods and problems of
PE, school testing and planning of PE, the nature of female
PE and the organisation of school PE. Through this study
of Soviet experience, Chinese educators concluded that
physical education should be considered a subject on a par
with all others.
The Labour Defence System was largely confined to
schools above middle school level in the first half of the
1950s. (37) Given the Labour Defence System’s similarity to
the Soviet “Ready for Labour and Defence” system, (38) five
basic aspects of Chinese physical education were recognised
at this stage: (i) Exercise was the core of the physical train-
ing programme. Participation in a varied set of exercises was
viewed as preparation for all other aspects of physical edu-
cation; (ii) Physical education involving both games and
dance were included in the middle school programme; (iii)
Sports were seen as an extension of basic exercises with
competition; (iv) The Labour Defence System — physical
education involved training for labour and defence — was the
main focus of the upper school physical education pro-
gramme, and always had a military flavour; (v) Physical ed-
ucation involved complete patriotic and socialist education.
Mao’s influence on the new physical culture may have been
reflected in China’s Constitution in 1954. In referring to the
early achievement of the CCP — for example, in the
32. Ibid., p. 3.
33. South China Morning Post, No. 748, 9 Feb 1954: 14.
34. Ma Hsu-lun [Ma Xulun], “Minister of Education Ma Hsu-lun Reports on Education
Accomplishments During the Past Year,” in Survey of Mainland Press (142) 25 July
1951, pp. 5-12.
35. See Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, op. cit., p. 405.
36. Current Background, (9) 21 September 1950, p. 11.
37. Ibid., p. 12.
38. New Physical Culture, 30 July 1951: 18-20; Sport History, September 1989, pp. 76-77.
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preparatory meeting for the Eighth National Congress in
1956 — Mao said: 
China used to be stigmatised as a “decrepit empire”,
“the sick man of East Asia”, a country with a back-
ward economy and a backward culture, with no hy-
giene, poor at ball games and swimming, where the
women had bound feet, the men wore pigtails and eu-
nuchs could still be found, and where the moon did
not shine as brightly as in foreign lands. In short,
there was much that was bad in China. But after six
years’ work of transformation we have changed the
face of China. No one can deny our achievements. (39)
Obviously, Mao’s thoughts on physical culture were
coloured by his views on nationalism from 1917 to 1956.
After that, Mao increasingly questioned the validity of the
Soviet model as a guide to Chinese development. In a
speech entitled “On the Ten Great Relationships,” Mao
emphasized the importance of light industry and agriculture,
industrialization of the countryside, decentralized planning,
labour-intensive projects, the development of inland areas,
and the use of moral incentives rather than material ones in
stimulating revolutionary commitment. (40) This collection of
strategies, in Mao’s view, would lead to rapid economic de-
velopment and allow China to overtake the capitalist West.
The Great Leap Forward campaign was launched in 1958
to realize this aim, but it also reflected Mao’s utopian vision
of creating a specifically Chinese form of socialism, which
entailed a renewed emphasis on the key role of the peas-
antry and the ultimate achievement of a “collectivist cornu-
copia.” (41) This resulted in a considerable setback for sport
and physical education and the Labour Defence System
during the Great Leap Forward.
Although Chinese sport was curtailed, a nation-wide sports
system managed to be established during this period. Large
banners emblazoned with three Chinese characters pro-
claiming the Great Leap Forward – “Da Yue Jin” – ex-
pressed a reversal of economic policy that called for a dra-
matic rise in industrial production. Mao’s introduction of the
slogan “more, faster, better, more economical” (duo kuai
hao sheng) at a conference in Chengdu in 1958 resulted in
widespread implementation of “more and faster” at the ex-
pense of “better and more economical,” and the failure of
the Great Leap Forward can ultimately be attributed to pol-
itics rather than economics. (42)
The Great Leap Forward destroyed China’s system of sta-
tistics, which in turn affected the “Ten-year Guidelines for
Sports Development” that called for “40 million people to
achieve the standard of the Labour Defence System, 8 mil-
lion people to achieve the basic sports standard, and 5,000
people to become top athletes.” (43) The guidelines further
aimed at a general achievement of the basic standard of
labour defence, with the first target set at 150 million and
the second at 200 million. The first general target set for ac-
tive sports participants was set at 50 million and the second
at 70 million, while the first target for top-notch athletes was
10,000 and the second 15,000. (44) These high targets for
sports development were almost impossible to achieve be-
cause of the tendency toward untruthfulness, exaggeration,
and formalism. (45) This tendency finally ceased in 1960,
when the CCP and Mao admitted the errors of the Great
Leap Forward and launched a new policy of recovery and
readjustment.
Following on the heels of the Great Leap Forward, the de-
velopment of sports in the early stage of the Cultural Revo-
lution was affected by disruption of competitive sports, the
dismantling of the training system, the closure of sports
schools, the discontinued participation of Chinese teams in
overseas competitions, and the condemnation and persecu-
tion of outstanding athletes as offspring of the bour-
geoisie. (46) Evidence of the damage inflicted on Chinese
sports from 1968 to 1970 can still be found, particularly in
the form of dazibao (big character posters) used to attack in-
dividual CCP members during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao Zedong’s 1966 dazibao entitled “Bombard Headquar-
ters” (47) was interpreted as an attack on Liu Shaoqi, Deng
Xiaoping, and other prominent leaders of the Party appara-
tus, and the Maoist position became increasingly radical dur-
ing the early stage of the Cultural Revolution as the struggle
among the top leadership intensified.
In a Red Guard dazibao, He Long, the CCP’s first Sports
Minister, was attacked for supporting the revisionist sports
policy and publications of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping,
39. James Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society: Development of Sport and Physical Education in
Russia and the USSR, Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1977, pp. 410-415.
40. See Selected Works of Mao Zedong, vol. 5, op. cit., p. 313.
41. Ibid., pp. 284-307.
42. Roderick MacFarquhar, China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command, Massachusetts, The
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1972, p. 467.
43. Ibid., pp. 309-310.
44. “Report about the Ten Year Guidelines for Sports Development” in Archive of the State
General Sports Administration of China, 8 September 1958.
45. Ibid.
46. See Gu Shiquan, op. cit., p. 350.
47. Fan Hong, “Two Roads to China: The Inadequate and the Adequate,” in The International
Journal of the History of Sport, 18 (2), 2001, p.158.
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and most of his colleagues were also attacked as revisionists
and counter-revolutionaries. (48) Deputy sports ministers
Rong Gaotang, Li Menghua, and Li Da, as well as Wang
Ling in the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission,
were brought down. (49) Sports development was discontin-
ued, mass sport was eliminated, sports training programmes
were replaced by political struggle sessions, and New Phys-
ical Culture and Physical Culture News ceased publication.
The National Sports System was vilified as an independent
realm beyond proletarian politics and CCP control. In a daz-
ibao entitled “My Accusation,” Zhuang Zedong, who won
the 26th World Table Tennis Championship in Beijing in
1961, accused He Long and Rong Gaotang of revisionist
policy and stated that (i) he was physically abused for over
eight years in the table tennis team, (ii) he became a seed
of revisionism under Rong Gaotang’s guidance, and (iii) he
wanted to revolt, he wanted to rebel, and he wanted to be a
servant of the people. (50) These dazibaos typically ended
with the slogan “Bring down Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping,
He Long, and Rong Gaotang! Long Live Mao Zedong
Thought! Long Live Chairman Mao!” (51) He Long was tor-
tured both mentally and physically and finally died on 9
June 1969. (52)
Further tragedies included the suicides of three top table
tennis players during the “Cleanse the Class Ranks” cam-
paign, which was modelled on pilot studies at six factories
and two universities in Beijing that were under Mao’s per-
sonal supervision. (53) Fu Qifang, a famous table tennis coach
and player, came from Hong Kong with Jiang Yongning to
join the Chinese National Table Tennis Team in 1952. Fu
Qifang was accused of being a spy and tortured by other ath-
letes in denunciation meetings, ultimately hanging himself
on 16 April 1968. Jiang Yongning, accused of being a
Japanese spy, hanged himself on 16 May 1968. A third
table tennis player from Hong Kong, Rong Guotuan, who
had won the first world table tennis championship in Chi-
nese sports history in 1959, hanged himself on 20 June
1968. In his last letter, Rong wrote, “I am not a spy. Please
do not suspect me. I apologise to you all. I value my honour
more than my life.” (54) These were the most notorious
tragedies in Chinese sport during the Cultural Revolution.
The Chinese sports management, training, and competition
system was completely abolished in 1967, and most sports
teams were dismantled, including 47 provincial and munici-
pal football teams comprised of 1,124 players and 115 pro-
fessional coaches. Most sports training equipment and facil-
ities were destroyed, and stadiums became gathering places
for denunciation meetings. (55) Jung Chang comments that
the People’s Sports Stadium no longer hosted any kind of
sport, since competitive games were condemned by Mao
and athletes had to devote themselves to the Cultural Revo-
lution. (56) Sports were replaced by activities expressing loy-
alty to Chairman Mao, such as “loyalty dances,” which were
physical exercises following the rhythms of Mao’s quota-
tions. (57) As Chang testifies:
In the autumn of 1968 a new type of team took over
my school; they were called “Mao Zedong Thought
Propaganda Teams”… The old textbooks had all
been condemned as “bourgeois poison”, and nobody
was brave enough to write new ones. So we just sat
in classes reciting Mao’s articles and reading People’s
Daily editorials. We sang songs of Mao’s quotations,
or gathered to dance “loyalty dance”, gyrating and
waving our Little Red Books. Making “loyalty
dances” compulsory was one of the major orders is-
sued by the Revolutionary Committees throughout
China. (58)
Although sports competition was halted during the early
stage of the Cultural Revolution, sports performance and
mass sport competition became part of celebration activities
among the Revolutionary Communities after the 9
th
Party
Congress of 1969. Athletes had to dance the “loyalty
dances” before competitions and recited Mao’s quotations
loudly when players violated a sports rule. (59) At the same
time, martial arts competitions were replaced by the devel-
opment and promotion of “loyalty boxing.” (60) Many martial
arts experts were denounced as ministers and sons of the
48. People’s Daily, 5 August 1966, p. 1.
49. Tan Fang and Zhao Wumian, Highlights of Da-zi-bao: During the Cultural Revolution,
New York, Mirror, 1996, pp. 403-404.
50. Thomas W. Robinson, The Cultural Revolution in China, Berkeley, University of California,
1971, pp. 307-312.
51. See Tan Fang and Zhao Wumian, op. cit., pp. 332-335.
52. Ibid.
53. Gu Shiquan’s Chinese History of Sports, op. cit., Beijing, Beijing University of Physical
Education, pp. 360-361.
54. Jung Chang, Wild Swans: Three Daughters of China, London, Flamingo, 1993, p. 496.
55. Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, Ten Years History of “The Cultural Revolution”, Hong Kong, San
Ming Books Press, 1989, pp. 411-412.
56. Wu Shaozu’s Sports History of the People’s Republic of China 1949-1999, Beijing, China
Books Publisher, 1999, p. 175
57. See Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, op. cit., p. 494.
58. Ibid., p. 386.
59. Ibid., pp. 502-503.
60. See Wu Shaozu’s Sports History of the People’s Republic of China 1949-1999, op. cit.,
p. 188.
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feudal era, “monsters,” and reactionaries, and many valuable
classical boxing books were destroyed and as the poison of feu-
dalism, capitalism, and revisionism. Martial arts competitions
were attacked as a medium of feudalism and superstition, and
martial arts weapons and equipment were confiscated. (61) This
was the second setback for martial arts after 1949.
The intensity and violence of the Red Guard movement
brought China to the brink of civil war from 1966 to 1969.
At the same time, Mao swept away “capitalist roaders” and
“covert enemies” such as President Liu Shaoqi, Party Gen-
eral Secretary Deng Xiaoping, Sports Minister He Long,
and their followers who disregarded Mao’s policies after the
Great Leap Forward. (62) Mao gradually increased the politi-
cal status of the PLA and reconstructed the Party to re-es-
tablish its control over society by reorganising most of the
previous state and mass organisations after the Ninth Con-
gress of April 1969, while Premier Zhou Enlai worked to
restore scientific and educational standards, including sports.
Premier Zhou acknowledged China’s sports achievements
from 1949 to 1966 during the Cultural Revolution’s first na-
tional physical culture and sports conference in July 1971,
and his support inspired many sports officials and experts.
Subsequently, Zhou gradually restored the sports training,
competition, schools, organisations, and administration that
had been discontinued between 1966 and 1970. Sports of-
ficials were reappointed to the State Physical Culture and
Sports Commission, which had been dominated by the
PLA between 1966 and 1971. National countryside sports
development meetings, national labour sports development
meetings and the national spare time physical education and
sports schools conference were held in 1972. (63)
Mass sports development became an important policy of the
Chinese government in 1972. For example, a traditional
round-the-city race was held in the Beijing Chongwen Dis-
trict during the Spring Festival of 1972. The Beijing No. 26
Middle School fielded more than 100 boys and girls in 20
teams to take part in a middle school cross-country race, as
described in an article entitled “Mass Physical Training.” (64)
The first National Middle School Sports meet was held in
1973. (65) Sports development was interrupted again, how-
ever, when Zhou’s restoration work was attacked in another
political campaign. On 18 January 1974, with Mao’s ap-
proval, the Party circulated a document prepared under the
direction of Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife) entitled “The Doc-
trines of Lin Biao, Confucius, and Mencius,” which marked
the formal start of the official campaign to “Criticize Lin
Biao, criticize Confucius” (pi Lin, pi Kong). Masterminded
and led by the Gang of Four (Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen,
Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan), and foreshadowed by
the 1974 New Year’s Day joint editorial in the People’s
Daily, Hongqi (Red Flag), and the Liberation Army
News, (66) this campaign was intended to undermine Zhou
Enlai. (67)
During the restoration period, Zhou appointed Wang Meng
head of the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission
and permitted Physical Culture Daily to resume publication
in 1971. Nonetheless, during the “Criticize Lin Biao, criti-
cize Confucius” campaign Wang Meng was replaced by
Zhuang Zedong, three-time winner of the World Table Ten-
nis Championship, who became a confidant of Jiang Qing
and organised his own clique to support the “Gang of
Four.” (68) Under the slogans of “sports revolution” and
“sports competition reform,” the Gang of Four attacked the
former leaders of the State Physical Culture and Sports
Commission as “third generation revisionists” and “bour-
geois sports without capitalists,” and gradually took over the
commission and sports organisations from 1974 to 1976.
Zhou Enlai made concessions to the Gang of Four regard-
ing the State Physical Culture and Sports Commission and
the Ministry of Culture, but he maintained power over the
Ministry of Education during the 1974 power struggle. (69)
Chinese sports did not emerge from chaos until Mao’s death
on 9 September 1976 and the arrest of the “Gang of Four”
61. Yu Yun-tai, The History of the Chinese Martial Arts, Beijing, People’s Sports Publishing
House, 1985, p. 195.
62. Ibid., 195 and The History of the Chinese Martial Arts (1996), edited by National
Research Institute of Martial Arts, Beijing, People’s Sport Publishing House Press, pp.
368-369.
63. See Marc Blecher, China Against the Tides, London, Pinter, 1997, pp. 75-77.
64. See Gu Shiquan, op. cit., pp. 361-362.
65. “Upon our arrival at 6:30 in the morning, we saw some 500 students training on the
sports grounds—some practicing throwing the javelin, discus, hand-grenade and other
objects, some running or practicing the high jump and long jump, and some playing ball
games. At 7:30, the students gathered on the large field or in the courtyards, doing set-
ting-up exercise to music broadcast over the radio. Classes began at 8:00… and after
4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the students played ball games and engaged in various
other activities. So keen are the youngsters for ball games that they throng the sports
grounds even on Sundays… Through the Great Cultural Revolution, the teacher began
by way of introduction, we have come to understand that in physical training there is
also the question of “For whom?” Since the purpose is to build up the people’s health,
we should stress the mass character of such training. It is wrong to train just a few
“stars”; our duty is to help the majority of students take an interest in physical training
and actively participate in sports activities… First of all, we do our best to popularize
those sports which give a comparatively large amount of exercise but require no partic-
ular skill, such as running, tug of war, skipping and throwing the hand grenade…
Secondly, we pay proper attention to combining athletic meets with everyday sports
activities.” Beijing Review, No. 14, 7 April 1972, pp. 11-13.
66. See Gu Shiquan, op. cit., p. 362.
67. See Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, op. cit., p. 671.
68. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Politics of China 1949-1989, Cambridge, Cambridge
University, 1993, pp. 286-287.
69. See Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, op. cit., p. 678.
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in October 1976, which officially brought the Cultural Rev-
olution to an end. 
How can we fairly assess sports development during the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution? In terms of official
statements, Chinese leaders continued to portray the Cul-
tural Revolution in glowing terms as late as 1977, even after
the purge of the “Gang of Four.” As Premier Hua Guofeng
declared at the Eleventh Party Congress, “Beyond any
doubt, the Cultural Revolution will go down in the history of
the proletariat as a momentous innovation which will shine
through the passage of time.” (70) Indeed, Hua promised that
more Cultural Revolutions would take place in the future as
a means of continuing the struggle against bourgeois and
capitalist influences within the Party. (71) The official line
completely changed within two years, however; in mid-1979,
Chairman Ye Jianying described the Cultural Revolution as
“an appalling catastrophe suffered by all our people.” The
prevailing interpretation more recently is that China was
never in danger of capitalist restoration, that Mao’s diagno-
sis of China’s political situation in 1966 “ran counter to re-
ality,” that the programmes produced in the latter stages of
the Cultural Revolution were impractical and utopian, and
that the Red Guards were naive and impressionable youth
led by “careerists, adventurists, opportunists, political degen-
erates, and the hooligan dregs of society.” (72) An official res-
olution on Party history, adopted in 1981, condemned the
Cultural Revolution as causing “the most severe setback and
the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the state, and the
people since the founding of the People’s Republic.” (73)
Sports historians and writers have provided a number of ar-
guments on the Cultural Revolution, most of them agreeing
with the official resolution of 1981. Gu Shiquan, for exam-
ple, says that the Cultural Revolution represented 10 years
of unprecedented disaster for sport. (74) Wu Shaozu, the for-
mer director of the State General Sports Administration,
agrees with the official resolution on Party history of 1981
and condemns the Cultural Revolution for destroying sports
development. He notes that during the Cultural Revolution,
(i) tragedies occurred among the top table tennis players
who committed suicide; (ii) the sports level declined be-
cause most athletes were involved with the Cultural Revolu-
tion and ceased their training programmes; and (iii) the en-
tire sports system was at a standstill or near standstill. (75)
Chen Rong argues that under the influence of cultural dic-
tatorship and with metaphysics on the rampage, sports schol-
arship was extremely distorted by leftist thought, and sports
were put to the service of politics. He criticises the policy of
“friendship first, competition second” as effectively express-
ing Mao’s revolutionary line of “friendship first” meaning
“politics first,” and turning sports into a political tool during
the Cultural Revolution. (76) However, he notes, political ide-
ology continued to influence the development of sport in the
post-Mao era.Sport,  ideology and the  post-Mao  era  
After the failure of Mao’s socialism and the Cultural Revo-
lution, the country’s new leader Deng Xiaoping advocated
reformist “Open Door” policies and socialism with “Chi-
nese characteristics.” The criticism of Mao and Maoism and
the establishment of an alternative rapidly progressed, but
Deng seldom criticized Mao directly for the sake of preserv-
ing the legitimacy of the CCP’s authoritarian rule.
Drawing upon the more economically deterministic, or so-
called scientific Marxism, Deng stressed that the problem of
Chinese Socialism was rooted in the backwardness and de-
ficiencies of the production force. Thus, opening the market
and expanding economic growth became principles of post-
70. Ibid., p. 718.
71. The Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China—documents, 1977,
pp. 51-52.
72. See Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, op. cit., p. 231.
73. Beijing Review, 5 October 1979, pp. 15, 18, 19.
74. See Yan Jiaqi and Gao Gao, op. cit., p. 231.
75. Ibid., p. 364.
76. See Wu Shaozu, op. cit., pp. 171-200.
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Mao ideology. Contrary to the Cultural Revolution era,
competition was considered good under market economic re-
form. (77) The CCP leadership encouraged the development
of sport and international participation and aspirations to
achieve the highest level of sports performance. (78)
Mao himself never promoted high-performance sport, but
after his death the primacy of ideology in sports was gradu-
ally replaced by more Western concepts of athletics, and the
Maoist emphasis on hygiene and self-discipline declined. (79)
For example, while Mao refused to anthropomorphize the
contest between nation-states in sporting events, Deng Xi-
aoping emphasized “Promoting Sport for the Nation’s
Pride” in Tiyu Bao on 15 September 1983.
China began to pay serious attention to Olympic sports after
the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, in which China rep-
resented the largest communist presence (most communist
states followed the Soviet-led boycott). China placed fourth
in the 1984 Summer Olympics, a position it held again in the
1992 Barcelona Olympics. China also sent a delegation
headed by Wei Zhenlan to learn from the Los Angeles Or-
ganizing Committee about how to profit from major sporting
events such as the Olympic Games. China noted that sport
could be profitable, and could also inspire Chinese national-
ism. In particular, the success of Chinese teams at the 1984
Los Angeles Olympic Games aroused patriotism and nation-
alism. It was one of the first visible steps for Chinese sport to
“break out of Asia and advance into the world.” 
The Chinese government approved two key documents in
1984 and 1986 with regard to the reform of sport. The first
document was a CCP central committee dispatch, “A noti-
fication about moving further ahead in sports development,”
sent to all sports officials on 5 October 1984. The dispatch
affirmed a number of crucial points. First, Chinese sports
had developed well in the 1980s, with the great achieve-
ment of Chinese athletes at the 1984 Los Angeles
Olympics proving that Chinese sports were approaching
world levels of performance and had the potential to further
promote Chinese national pride and self-confidence, as well
as patriotism and support outside of China. Second, while
Chinese sport may have progressed, there was still a gap at
the very top level of international sport. To reduce this gap
China envisaged promoting a truly popular sports policy that
involved: (i) actively developing both rural and urban physi-
cal activities; (ii) working hard to promote people’s health;
(iii) training young children in school; (iv) improving train-
ing and competition systems and developing scientific train-
ing research; and (v) focusing on developing excellence in
sporting events. (80)
The document indicated that the state should establish a sports
team both “red and expert” with excellent athletes and a
coaching team. The state was to encourage excellence by re-
warding athletes with honours and financial inducements, in
particular for special achievement. Retired international ath-
letes were to be encouraged to take jobs as instructors in higher
education. It was suggested that the budget for sport should be
increased. Furthermore, the CCP needed to strengthen sports
propaganda by promoting the positive function of sport, thus
popularising sports knowledge and attracting people to join in
physical activities. This literature was also expected to promote
patriotic education, collectivism, socialism, and communism
through sports achievement. Finally, all levels of Chinese Com-
munist Party Committees should demonstrate a concern with
providing support and leadership in sport. (81) The political func-
tions of sports were highlighted in terms of building socialist
thinking and a cultured civilization. Athletes, coaches, referees,
and sports workers were to be educated as socialists with
ideals, high moral standards, cultural knowledge, and disci-
pline, all of which were to be associated with patriotism, col-
lectivism, socialism, and communism. 
However, there were still problems with some of the re-
forms. The State Physical Culture and Sports Commission
N o  2 0 0 8 / 1 15
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of Asia and advance into the world.” 
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noted that: (i) Chinese levels of achievement in sport were
still below those of other advanced countries; (ii) although
sports development was still influenced by leftist thought,
there were weaknesses in terms of sport leadership, training,
and systems of competition; (iii) sports reform was not keep-
ing pace with economic reform; and (iv) the sports system
needed greater uniformity. The Commission published a fur-
ther document in 1986 outlining a draft proposal for reform-
ing the sports system, which was passed on 15 April 1986.
This draft policy contained clauses relating to: (i) improving
the level of sport leadership and confirming the State Phys-
ical Culture and Sports Commission’s overall role of leader-
ship, coordination, and supervision; (ii) establishing a scien-
tific training system; (iii) improving the system of sport com-
petitions; (iv) enhancing and promoting Chinese traditional
indigenous sports; (v) developing sports scientific research
gradually; (vi) reforming the sport and physical education
system; (vii) enhancing political thought on sport; (viii) im-
proving the sport prize system; and (ix) developing flexible
open polices in relation to international sport. (82)
All in all, the period between 1978 and 1989 marked a dis-
tinctive stage in the development of sport in China. It was a
stage during which China questioned most of the basic ele-
ments of Maoism and sought a new form of political author-
ity, economic activity, social organization, and cultural expres-
sion. Sport in some ways reflected the challenge of moving
steadily into the global sports system on China’s terms, while
at the same time wrestling with external expectations of sport-
ing ideals and democracy. Society’s state and class structures
were undergoing a basic transformation under the CCP’s re-
form policies, and sports were incorporated into this reform. 
During the first decade of Deng’s reforms, the impulses for
political and economic structural reform tended to ebb and
flow. As the 1989 democracy movement drew the decade to
a close, it became clear that economic change had advanced
faster than political change, but sports reforms still enjoyed
the full support of the government. The 1990 Asian Games
in Beijing were a major political and social event for China,
and signalled to the rest of the world that China was in the
market for hosting major international sporting events.
Through its control over television and print news coverage,
the government sought to use the Games to boost morale
and confidence in the wake of the disaster of 1989. China
did well in terms of medals, far better than other countries,
and the Chinese people were enthusiastic about the Games,
in particular the opening and closing ceremonies. Even peo-
ple who expressed anti-government views seemed to be
proud of the Games. Thus, the government used the Asian
Games to convince the world of China’s intention to con-
tinue and even expand its policies of reform. As Jiang
Zemin claimed, while moving at its own pace, China would
quickly be seen to “set up the process of reform and open-
ing up to the outside world.” (83)One century,  one  ideo logy
Through a historical sociological analysis of sport, Maoism,
and the Beijing Olympics, we perceive Western imperialism
as the agent bringing modern sports into China. Since the
establishment of Republican China in 1911, Chinese people
had lived under the constant threat of civil war and imperi-
alism, so it is not surprising that national defence was a pri-
mary consideration of sports, and that sports were often as-
sociated with nationalism in China. 
Mao’s thoughts on physical culture and sport were fostered
within this military and nationalist atmosphere. Mao ex-
pressed his anti-intellectualist (84) attitude and admiration for
bestiality (shouxing zhuyi) in his later thoughts on physical
culture and the physical training programs of the Red Army.
In Mao’s Socialist New China, the first step was to import
the socialist sports system from Soviet Union in the 1950s.
Later, as Mao decided to experiment with a uniquely Chi-
nese form of utopia, with tragic consequences, the develop-
ment of sport was interrupted, and sports officials suffered
both mentally and physically during the Cultural Revolution
from 1966 to 1976. 
Maoist sports embodied a specific ideology, combining Chi-
nese nationalism and the ideology of Communist revolution.
Unlike other Soviet or post-colonial Third World countries,
China under Mao was prevented from using competitive
sports as nationalist tools to defeat capitalist or imperialist
counties by its isolation in the international arena. The ide-
ology of “friendship first, competition second,” for example,
reflected the radical “ultra-left” and “self-reliance” policy be-
hind Mao’s hostility to both the U.S. and the Comintern (in-
cluding the Soviet Union). 
Some writers have argued that China began to concentrate
its resources on elite athletes in order to produce high per-
formances in the international arena in the period of Great
Leap Forward, (85) and that this represented a turning point
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from mass to elite sport in China. Fan concludes that the
Cultural Revolution movement was “not all bad” because it
contributed to making sport a powerful ideological vehicle
for achieving diplomatic policies. (86) The Cultural Revolu-
tion also increased the exposure of rural peasants and
women to modern sports. Since Mao’s death in 1976, China
has experienced a cultural and ideological transformation un-
precedented in the history of communist societies. In partic-
ular, sport has become one of the most important cultural
phenomena in China as Maoist socialism has gradually sub-
sided. Sport in China has been widely promoted with the
spread of capitalism and its consumer culture in the last two
decades. At the same time, however, there are indications
that Maoist nationalist ideology has been retained in the
post-Mao era. For example, after NATO’s accidental bomb-
ing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 8 May 1999,
the Chinese government temporarily banned television
broadcasts of NBA basketball games in protest. (87)
On the other hand, an increasing number of Western and
Chinese researchers over the last two decades have been ex-
amining sport in China through a post-colonial theoretical
framework. (88) A number of postcolonial writers use criticism
of Western universalism as a basis for explaining non-West-
ern problems. (89) Dualism or essentialism should be avoided
when exploring sport culture in China. Indeed, it seems that
some writings use “Chineseness” in the same way that “sick
man” has been used to understand a world construed as
manifestly different. (90) In Chinese works, the connection of
sport with the notion of “sick man” is even more apparent
and popular, as in From Sick Man of Asia to Sports Super-
power:
It was the Western powers that opened the door of
China… evil smuggling of opium into China... ruined
the physique of the Chinese people… imposed upon
them the shameful name of ‘Sick Man of Asia.’” (91)
In conclusion, this paper has examined both Chinese and
Western works to illustrate how scholars and writers may use
Orientalist notions as a vehicle to extol or criticize the devel-
opment of sport in China. Specifically, these works have not
only represents the Chinese as “imagined Olympians,” but
have also re-invented the “sick man” stereotype that was es-
sential to the development of Maoist thought. It is important
to recognize that the notion of post-colonialism has brought
a new perspective to analyse the problematic kernel of na-
tionalist ideology at the heart of the hybrid formed by sport,
Maoism, and the Beijing Olympics. •
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